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SOVEREIGNTY: INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND
TRIBAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
Douglas R. Wright
All wars have been fought over one word: Sovereignty.-Monroe
McKay'
Words don't have meaning, only people have meaning.-Stephen
Fuller'
A discussion of Indian sovereign immunity must begin with
definitions. The term "sovereign immunity" is ambiguous. It
refers to several interrelated concepts, but it is often used without
regard to the differences between them.
Two concepts involve the idea of immunity from suit. This im-
munity may exist (1) in the courts of the sovereign being sued,
and (2) in the courts of other sovereigns, although for different
reasons.
In other contexts the term may be used to connote that a
sovereign has all governmental powers within its jurisdictional
area so that neither the sovereign government nor those it governs
can be made subject to the rule of any other sovereign, except by
consent or conquest. Thus there is by negative inference an "im-
munity" from the laws and regulations of other governments.'
This is not true sovereign immunity but merely an application of
the principles of territorial jurisdiction. In this note a sovereign's
"immunity" from the legislative acts of other sovereigns will be
called autonomy, and the term "sovereignty" will be used to con-
note the gamut of governmental power. The term "sovereign im-
munity" will be restricted to mean only immunity from suit.
Moreover, because this note concludes that traditional sovereign
immunity ought not to be considered part of Indian tribal
sovereignty, the term "tribal immunity" will be used instead of
"Indian sovereign immunity."
This paper will examine the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and compare the application of it to Indian tribes with its ap-
plication to foreign countries and states. It will also touch upon
the nature of tribal sovereignty and contrast the approach courts
have taken in resolving conflicts between tribal and state
legislative powers with the approach used in the tribal immunity
cases.
1. From a lecture attended by author.
2. From a lecture attended by author.
3. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
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Sovereign Immunity in a Sovereign's Own Courts
A sovereign's immunity from suit in its own courts rests on a
different foundation from its immunity in the courts of other
sovereigns. The latter form is closely related to the concepts of
territorial jurisdiction, autonomy, and sovereignty. The exercise
of judicial power by one monarch's courts over another monarch
was considered just as- much an act of hostility or assertion of
superiority as an exercise of legislative power. Therefore, a
monarch was "immune" from suit in the courts of other rulers.
His immunity from suit in his own courts, though, was based on
somewhat different principles. This concept of sovereign immuni-
ty will be discussed first.
"The Old Gray Mare Ain't What She Used To Be"
The doctrine that a sovereign is immune from suit in its own
courts, as presently understood in America (American sovereign
immunity), is very different from the ancient original (Old
English sovereign immunity).
Originally, sovereign immunity did not bar recovery from the
crown for violations of a subject's legal rights;4 it was only a pro-
cedural rule compelling the subject to proceed by petition of right
rather than by an action at law. If the petition of right stated a
proper legal claim, the king endorsed it, "let right be done to the
parties," thereby authorizing his court to render judgment. Such
"consent" apparently was given as a matter of course.' "The
King, as the fountain of justice and equity, could not refuse to
redress wrongs when petitioned to do so by his subjects." 6 In-
deed, the maxim, "the King can do no wrong," originally con-
noted that the king was "not entitled to do wrong." 7
From this it is evident that one of the fundamental principles
of the common law before the American Revolution was that the
sovereign was subject to the law.' If the crown was accountable
according to law, and if a subject was entitled to petition the king
as a matter of right for redress upon terms ultimately adjudged
4. L. JAFFE. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 197 (abridged student
ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
5. Id. at 197, 199.
6. 9 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 8 (3 ed. 1944) [hereinafter cited as
HOLDSWORTHI. See C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 6-7
(1972) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS].
7. JAFFE, supra note 4, at 199.




by the king's court, then what was the source of the sovereign's
immunity from "suit" in that court?
The answer is courtesy and common sense. The king was "the
fountain of justice and equity." It would have been a personal in-
sult to the crown for a subject to seek a writ-a means of com-
pulsion-against it when it was the crown's goodness and grace
that guaranteed justice in the first place, especially when the sub-
ject had a right to petition the king directly. The petition of right
respected the king's theoretically unfailing justice. 9 Likewise, it
violated common sense for a subject to seek a writ against the
king. The writs were nothing more than documents issued in the
king's name exercising his sovereign power to compel redress
when rights were violated. Thus, not only was it repugnant to
suppose that the king had to be compelled to do right, but it was
ridiculous to think his power should be directed against himself in
a writ.'" The petition of right was much more respectful and
realistic.
Thus it is apparent that Old English sovereign immunity arose
out of respect for the king both as a person and as the source of
law, equity, and justice. It was inseparable from the idea that
subjects had a right to petition the Crown directly for redress.
The doctrine was not founded on any notion that the sovereign
was unaccountable to his subjects. On the contrary, it was based
on the idea that the king would faithfully fulfill his sovereign du-
ty to render justice when petitioned to do so. Sovereign immunity
both supported the petition of right by compelling its use, and
was supported by it because the idea that the -king would, as a
matter of right, redress wrongs upon petition was the source of
the inconsistency and insult that the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity was designed to prevent.
American sovereign immunity is much different. The attempt
to transfer the doctrine to the newly independent American states
was like trying to put a square peg into a round hole. However,
instead of concluding that the peg did not fit" and discarding it,
the courts figuratively chopped off the corners, turned it upside
down, and pounded it in with the heavy hammer of tradition. 2
In the newly independent states the people were sovereign and
the government was their servant. There was no monarch to in-
9. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 6, at 10.
10. JAFFE, supra note 4, at 198.
11. But see Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
12. See JACOBS, supra note 6, at 5.
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sult, no king to issue a writ against himself, and no king to sign a
petition of right. Moreover, the concept that the king was ac-
countable according to law' 3-which was an implicit recognition
that justice actually came from equal accountability under fair
laws, and not from the inherent goodness of the king-was car-
ried one step farther. In the United States this became explicit.
The people were to be governed by laws, not by men. And the
sovereign people were to make the laws through their chosen
representatives. It was to be "a government of the people, by the
people and for the people.""'
Thus, the notion of the inherent goodness and justice of the
monarch was abandoned while the concept of the supremacy of
law was embraced. Because it was the monarch's supposed in-
herent justice that spawned the insult and incongruity that Old
English sovereign immunity was designed to prevent, abandon-
ment of the former notion would seem to have invited abandon-
ment of the latter. Unfortunately, however, the courts did not
respond to the invitation.
This was more a result of misperception than design. The
courts failed to perceive in the change from a sovereign ruler with
subjects to a sovereign citizenry the fundamental doctrinal
changes that made sovereign immunity unsuitable for republican
governments. They noted only that the identity of the sovereign
had changed, assumed that a suit against the government of a
state was a suit against the sovereign people, and tried to apply
the familiar rules concerning suit against the sovereign.'" This
resulted in retention by the states of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. More important, it also resulted in abolition of the peti-
tion of right.'6 The courts reasoned that because there was no
sovereign capable of personally endorsing such a petition, it
simply could not be used.' 7 As a result, Old English sovereign im-
munity, which operated merely as a procedural preference for the
petition of right and was therefore consistent with, and depen-
dent upon, the ready availability of legal redress from the king,
was imperceptibly transformed into American sovereign im-
munity-a substantive rule barring redress completely.
American sovereign immunity became not only incapable of
13. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 6, at 10.
14. A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (1864).
15. See, e.g., Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429-50 (1793) (Iredell, J.,
dissenting).
16. J m, supra note 4, at 196-97.





doing the job that Old English sovereign immunity was created to
do, but it was violative of two fundamental principles of law
upon which the doctrine was originally-based and which are still
vital principles in America.
Old English sovereign immunity was designed to prevent insult
to the monarch and to eliminate the nonsensical possibility that
the king would have to compel himself to do right. In America
there is no king to insult or compel.
Furthermore, the lifeblood of Old English sovereign immunity
was dependent on the basic concept that the sovereign was ac-
countable for violations of the rights of his subjects,"8 coupled
with the notion that it was the monarch's sovereign and in-
escapable duty to render and guarantee justice to them. 9 In con-
trast, American sovereign immunity disables members of the
sovereign citizenry from suing their servant, the government,
thereby rendering the government unaccountable even for viola-
tions of constitutional rights2" and discharging it from its
delegated duty to administer justice.2 Whether we say that "the
old gray mare ain't what she used to be,'-or that the peg has
been hammered in upside down, it is clear that the results pro-
duced by American sovereign immunity are opposed to those
achieved under the Old English system which supposedly was
simply continued.
American sovereign immunity is a complete misfit in the
American scheme of government. The Supreme Court has called
it "disfavored," 22 and commentators have called it much worse.23
The question, then, is whether tribal immunity from suit in tribal
courts is related to this "pernicious doctrine."
Tribal Immunity: You Can't Get There From Here
The nature of tribal immunity depends partly on its origin, and
any analysis of it will be influenced by the label attached to it.
18. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 6, at 10.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
21. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., the Preamble: "WE, the people of the United States, in
Order to ... establish Justice... do ordain and establish this Constitution."
22. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 391 (1939). Cf. Na-
tional Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359 (1955); Kennecot Copper Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 581 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting opinion).
23. See, e.g., 2 ANTiEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674 (1969) (referring to
"the pernicious doctrine of sovereign immunity" as "a reflection of an immature
jurisprudence that thought the political state could be exempted from the ethical code
governing the culture.").
1980]
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First, it is necessary to recognize that tribal immunity from suit in
tribal courts may well be a holdover from traditional Indian
ways. This is not unrealistic in view of the communal life-style
and tribal loyalty of many Indians." Hoebel's work tends to
show that among Indians redress of 'vrongs was often a private
matter between individuals. 5 In such a culture it would probably
never occur to a tribal member to assert that the tribe had
violated his rights, and even if he thought of it there was no
means of vindicating those rights other than rebellion. This de
facto immunity could be regarded as a part of tribal culture that
was retained even after tribal courts modeled on American courts
were established.
On the other hand, it is also possible that American sovereign
immunity came to the tribes in the same package as the Anglo-
American court system. If so, the doctrine would be no more ap-
propriate in tribal courts than it is in state or federal courts, and
probably would be less so. Two possibilities exist: Tribes such as
the pre-Removal Cherokees adopted the entire constitutional
republican form of government, including the judicial system;2"
or, a tribe that desired to continue resolving conflicts as it had
anciently, in order to obtain federal approval, adopted a tribal
court system that was patterned closely after the state and federal
judicial systems.
In the first instance, the same reasons for rejecting American
sovereign immunity would exist under the Cherokee constitution,
or one like it, as under the United States Constitution. Moreover,
unlike the American colonies, the notions of kingship or
sovereignty have been alien to Indian cultures for ages. 7 Old
English sovereign immunity would have been unknown to the
aboriginal tribes, so there seems little reason why its offspring-
American sovereign immunity-should be adopted by any tribe
attempting to establish a constitutional form of government. This
observation may be pertinent even to tribes that have not copied
the United States Constitution because many tribal governments
appear to have been originally much more like republics than
monarchies. 2
24. See E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 130-31 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
HOEBEL].
25. Id. at 132, 133-34, 147.
26. Cherokee Nation Const. art. 5, in A. GUTTMAN, STATES' RIGHTS AND INDIAN
REMOVAL: THE CHEROKEE NATION V. THE STATE OF GEORGIA 22 (1965).
27. See, e.g., HOEBEL, supra note 24, at 132.





In the second instance, where a tribe might reluctantly adopt
an American style court system, it probably got American sov-
ereign immunity along with it, whether this was desirable or not.
Suppose such a tribe used the tribal courts to resolve claims
against it and never raised the defense of sovereign immunity?
The result probably would not be a conclusion by observers that
the tribe lacked sovereign immunity, but only that it had given a
general consent to suit. If, on the other hand, immunity was
asserted, the conclusion of observers would probably be that the
tribe had exercised its inherent sovereign immunity-by which
would be meant American sovereign immunity.
This brings up another problem in defining the nature of tribal
immunity: the name. It is usually called sovereign immunity.
Naturally, that conjures up all sorts of images of kings and peti-
tions and so forth, all of which are inappropriate in considering
the immunity of an Indian tribe. A tribe claiming immunity is
either adopting American sovereign immunity or is claiming an
inherent immunity based on de facto immunity arising out of its
own nonmonarchial culture.
The obvious questions are: So what? What difference does it
make? Those are questions only tribal courts can answer, but
which ought not to be ignored. The proper present-day applica-
tion of ancient tribal de facto immunity and the reconciliation of
it with the ethical responsibility of the tribe from a consideration
of the principles of American or Old English sovereign immunity
cannot be attained. Likewise, the wholesale adoption of
American sovereign immunity from a finding of ancient de facto
tribal immunity is also impossible. The policy and rationale of
any asserted immunity ought to be examined in each case. Surely
the tribal courts will recognize this and make reasoned determina-
tions unsullied by Anglican notions of sovereign immunity.
Tribal Immunity in the Courts of Other Sovereigns:
There Is More Than Meets the Eye
An entirely different question is involved when considering
tribal immunity from suit in state and federal courts and that is
whether the tribe has immunity from suit in the courts of another
sovereign. Much of the maze of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country is pertinent here. However, it will be as-
sumed that a suit may be brought against a tribe in either state or
federal court which is entirely proper except for the question of
tribal immunity. Only that issue will be discussed.
In order to understand the nature of the question whether In-
1980]
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dian tribes should have such immunity, it will be necessary to ex-
amine that strand of the sovereign immunity doctrine which arose
from the relations of autonomous sovereigns in the area of inter-
national law. Then, because that strand is involved in each of the
following instances, a comparison will be made between tribal im-
munity in federal and state courts and (1) immunity for foreign
nations in American courts, (2) immunity for the several states
from private suit in federal court, and (3) immunity of one state
from suit in the courts of a sister state.
The immunity of foreign sovereigns from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States was firmly established in 1812 by
Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon.29 The doctrine originated in an era of personal
sovereignty when kings "could do no wrong." The exercise of
authority by one sovereign over another under such circum-
stances indicated hostility or superiority which could create ten-
sion and possibly war between the two countries. During that era,
sovereign immunity was a means of avoiding international con-
flict. When the era of kings had passed, the sovereign immunity
doctrine was retained by the courts primarily to avoid friction
between countries and to promote the nation's foreign relations.30
However, because of the dramatic changes in the nature and ac-
tivity of sovereigns, particularly in the first half of this century,
the wisdom of retaining the doctrine was seriously questioned.3
Gradually there was a shift away from the classical theory of
national sovereign immunity toward a newer theory. "According
to the classical or absolute theory ... a sovereign cannot without
his consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory . . . the
immunity... is recognized with regard to sovereign or public...
but not with respect to private acts.
' 3 2
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)33 en-
acted the restrictive theory into law. It provides that foreign na-
tions do not have sovereign immunity in either federal or state
courts from suits based on commercial activity in the United
29. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
30. See Comment, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J.
1148 (1954).
31. See, e.g., Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220 (1951).
32. Letter from the Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State to the Depart-
ment of Justice, May 19, 1952, 26 U.S. Dep't of State Bull. 984 (1952).
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602, 1611 (1980 Supp.).
[Vol. 8
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States or based on real property in the United States, or where an
implied waiver of immunity can be found. It also denies sovereign
immunity for tort claims in cases similar to those in which the
United States has waived its immunity in the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 4
Thus, there has been a significant erosion of sovereign immuni-
ty as granted in the courts of this country to foreign nations. This
must be contrasted with the inability of the courts to limit
significantly the immunity of "domestic dependent nations." 3 In
Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 6 the Arizona Supreme
Court noted that if the defendant in that case had been a foreign
nation rather than an Indian tribe, "it would have been amenable
to suit in either state or federal courts,"' 7 but held that the tribe
was immune from suit "withoui its consent or the consent of
Congress."38
Despite this reference to tribal consent and the traditional
reliance on the sovereign's own consent to suit (even to the extent
of relying on implied consent in the FSIA) as the sole means of
overcoming sovereign immunity, most cases speak of waivers of
tribal immunity only in terms of congressional consent.' 9
Moreover, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,4" the United States
Supreme Court stated: "It is settled that a [congressional] waiver
of sovereign immunity 'cannot be implied but must be unequivo-
cally expressed.' '41 This seems to indicate that Indian tribes can
be sued in federal courts only if Congress expressly authorizes it
regardless of tribal consent.
Similar express language has been required for congressional
waivers of state sovereign immunity to federal court suits as well.
Congress has the power under the fourteenth amendment to ab-
rogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in federal
court despite the eleventh amendment's guarantee of that im-
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605 (1980 Supp.).
35. This classification of Indian tribes was announced in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
36. 103 Ariz. 425, 443 P.2d 421 (1968).
37. Id., 443 P.2d at 424 n.I.
38. Id.
39. E.g., United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940). Cf. Ken-
nerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (consensual tribal transfer of civil jurisdiction
to state of Montana not valid because congressionally mandated consent requirements of
Pub. L. 280 not complied with).
40. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
41. Id. at 58, quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976), quoting
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).
NOTES1980]
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munity.42 However, the courts will not find such a waiver unless
they find clearly that "Congress considered and firmly decided to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States." 43
This would tend to indicate that Indian tribes are on the same
footing as states with respect to amenability to suit in federal
courts. However, it is clear that a state can consent to such
suits." Indeed, a state may be held to have impliedly consented to
suit when it engages in congressionally regulated commercial ac-
tivities where Congress has made private suit a means of enforc-
ing its regulations.4" Why should states and foreign nations be
held amenable to suit in federal court on an implied waiver or
commercial activity theory, but not tribes?
It is well settled that Indian tribes are neither like foreign na-
tions nor like states," so perhaps it should not be surprising that
they are treated differently from either when it comes to sove-
reign immunity. There do, however, seem to be some inconsisten-
cies. Since comity with foreign independent nations only required
restrictive sovereign immunity, why should comity with depen-
dent nations require near classical sovereign immunity? And why,
when Congress has only constitutionally limited power over state
governments, can they be deemed to have impliedly waived their
sovereign immunity while Indian tribes subject to unlimited
federal power 7 cannot?
The probable answer, at least as far as immunity from suit in
federal courts is concerned, is that the immunity does not derive
from sovereignty at all. Tribal immunity does not seem to be a
matter of comity or avoiding friction as is the case in sovereign
immunity of foreign nations.4" Nor is it concerned with
federalism or a separation of sovereign powers as with the states.
Instead, it seems to be founded in the federal trust relationship to
the tribes. The federal government, as trustee for tribal land and
42. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
43. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
44. It has been held that states can consent to suits otherwise barred by the eleventl
amendment even though the amendment contains no such exception. Clark v. Barnard,
108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883), is the leading case on this issue although the state in that case,
as a voluntary intervenor to obtain money that had been paid into the court, may have
been more in the role of a plaintiff than a defendant.
45. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
46. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
47. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).





having a fiduciary duty to encourage the self-government of the
Indian tribes, has chosen to give great deference to the tribal
courts.
This may be reasonable and just, but again the question arises:
why call it sovereign immunity? That label fixes the analytical
framework and raises the question why tribes seem to be unable
to consent to suit in federal court on their own behalf.49 This
seems anomalous because the power to withhold consent is the
very source of sovereign immunity. It would seem more realistic
to speak of the refusal of federal courts to hear suits against In-
dian tribes in terms of congressional deference to tribal govern-
ment, consistent with its fiduciary duty to preserve tribal culture
and promote tribal self-determination, than to cloud the issue
with words like "sovereign immunity." Under this view, it would
be irrelevant whether a tribe had consented to suit if Congress
had determined that it was in the best interest of the tribe to be
immune.
If Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez"° had been decided using
this approach, the Court would have had to confront and resolve
the conflict between congressional deference to the tribal courts
and congressional intent to guarantee civil rights to Indians
through the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).21 Both of
these purposes would lie within Congress' powers and duties as
trustee and would have to be balanced. The approach actually
used by the Court accepted the fiction that the tribe had
something inherent called sovereign immunity, which was sepa-
rate from and perhaps threatened by Congress' plenary powers.
This approach tended toward the idea that Congress, in exercis-
ing its fiduciary duties toward Indian tribes, would not infringe
on any of its inherent rights without expressly saying so. There-
fore, the Court was able to conclude that there was no "general
waiver of the tribe's sovereign immunity" because it found no
"unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent." 52
Of course, even if the balancing of federal interests approach
had been used, it is possible that the Court would have struck the
balance in the same way. Nevertheless, it would have been much
more enlightening to learn why the federal interest in granting
rights under the ICRA was outweighed by the federal interest in
49. See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
50. 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976).
52. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
19801
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deferring to the tribal courts. The present opinion merely states
the obvious: There was no express authorization of suit."
So far, the discussion has centered on tribal immunity in
federal courts, using the federal court immunity of both states
and foreign nations for comparison. There remains to be con-
sidered the immunity of tribes to suit in state court. Since the
rules54 making foreign nations suable in state courts are the same
as for federal courts, the inconsistencies noted above between
tribal immunity and the sovereign immunity of foreign nations
apply equally here.
However, the rules of state suability in the courts of a sister
state are much different. First, there is no constitutional
guarantee of a state's immunity from suit in the courts of sister
states, as there is in the eleventh amendment for private suits in
federal court." Second, the comity between sister states is based
on notions of equal status and mutually exclusive powers, where-
as the relationship between the federal government and the states
is based not on any notions of mere comity or equality, but on
constitutional federalism which limits the powers of the respective
sovereigns.
6
These differences prompted the United States Supreme Court
to decide in Nevada v. Hall7 that one state's immunity from suit
in the courts of another state is nothing more than a matter of
comity, that the doctrine that no sovereign may be sued in its
own courts without its consent does not support a claim of im-
munity in another sovereign's courts, and that there is no con-
stitutional bar to one state exercising jurisdiction over another. In
short, a state has no sovereign immunity defense in another
state's courts unless that other state chooses to honor it!
It appears, then, that foreign countries have only restrictive
sovereign immunity in state courts, and other states have only as
much sovereign immunity as the forum state chooses to give
them. Do similar principles apply to claims of tribal immunity?
Before Nevada v. Hall, the Arizona Supreme Court had noted in
Morgan-a wrongful death action against an Indian tribe alleging
negligence in the operation of a tribally owned marina near a
reservation-that if the defendant had been a state it would have
53. Id. at 1677.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1330, FSIA, 90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
55. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979).
56. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).




been amenable to suit, yet it held that the tribe was not." If
Morgan had arisen after Nevada v. Hall, could Arizona then
have asserted jurisdiction over the unconsenting Colorado River
Indian Tribe? If there is no constitutional bar against Arizona
asserting judicial jurisdiction over the state of Colorado, can
there be one against asserting it over the tribe? And if the doc-
trine that a sovereign is not suable in its own courts "affords no
support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts," 5 9
what support does a tribe have for claiming it is not amenable to
suit in state court?
The answer is the preemption doctrine based on the supremacy
clause.6" In Worcester v. Georgia,6" the United States Supreme
Court held invalid Georgia's attempt to exercise authority over
the sovereign Cherokee Nation because it violated the federal
government's constitutional grant of exclusive power to govern
its relationship with the Indian tribes, and also conflicted with
treaties as well as federal statutes regulating commerce with the
Indians. More than one hundred years later this preemption doc-
trine was extended in Williams v. Lee2 where the Court held that
a state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of a suit against a
reservation Indian because state jurisdiction would conflict with
"the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them."' 3 These cases provide support for the proposi-
tion that an Indian tribe cannot be sued in state court.
Clearly, this solution seems to beg the question. The
Worcester- Williams rationale is that state courts lack jurisdiction
because they are preempted by the tribes' interest in self-
government. It is difficult to see why the governmental interest of
an Indian tribe should have this effect when the same interest of a
sister state does not.
The crux of the matter is how the interest of Indians in self-
government can be fitted into the preemption doctrine. Ordinari-
ly, the preemption doctrine applies to bar state legislation (1)
"where there is an actual conflict between [state and federal]
legislation... "" as there was in Worcester, or (2) "where Con-
58. 443 P.2d 421, 424 n.1 (1968).
59. 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979).
60. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
61. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
62. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
63. Id. at 220.
64. E. NovA, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267 (1978).
1980]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1980
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
gress acts pursuant to a plenary power [to] . .. occupy or pre-
empt, the field." 65
Tribal interests in self-government do not fit this definition
because both branches of it require a conflict between state and
federal interests. Perhaps what Williams really means is that there
is a federal interest in "the right of reservation Indians" to
govern themselves." This is perfectly logical and consistent with
the trusteeship of the federal government: Congress has plenary
power over Indians and has occupied the field of Indian regula-
tion (except where it has been transferred under Public Law 280).
As trustee, Congress has a fiduciary duty to serve the best in-
terests of the Indian tribes. Therefore, as long as it is in the best
interests of the Indian tribes to govern themselves, Congress has
an interest in providing the "right" to do so, and any conflicting
state authority is preempted.
Again, it is apparent that no good purpose is served by apply-
ing the label "sovereign immunity." It would seem much more
principled to analyze cases involving conflicts between state and
tribal governments in terms of the federal government's interest
in guaranteeing the continued opportunity for Indian tribes to
govern themselves.
However, even though the preemption doctrine may properly
bar state interference with tribal self-government, there are still
problems with extending Williams to hold that a tribe, as well as
an individual Indian, is immune from suit. The preemption doc-
trine is based on principles of proper balance of legislative power,
and its purpose is to prevent the application of conflicting rules
simultaneously to the same subject matter. It is possible to read
Williams as holding that the federal interest in applying tribal law
to the individual Indian defendant preempted the state's attempt
to enforce conflicting state law upon him. This does not explain,
however, why the state court could not have been simply com-
pelled to apply tribal law. It seems that the Supreme Court believed
that the federal interest was not merely to see that tribal law was
applied to tribal members, but to see that wherever reasonably
possible, Indians were subjected to only tribal authority. This
goes far beyond sovereign immunity by effectively granting the
immunity defense to private citizens who happen to belong to an
Indian tribe.
It would appear to follow a fortiori that if the tribal member
has the benefit of sovereign immunity the tribe also has it.
65. Id. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 678 (1976).




However, that conclusion is influenced by the use of the sov-
ereign immunity label which assumes that the immunity originates
from tribal sovereignty. Actually, as we have seen, the immunity
stems from the preemption doctrine, which is designed to prevent
conflicting legal requirements from being imposed. The federal
interest regarding the suability of an individual Indian is different
from its interest in the suability of a tribe. As noted above,
Williams implies that the federal interest in the individual Indian
is that he be subjected only to tribal authority. The question is
which law applies. However, in a case like Morgan the question is
whether the tribe will be accountable under any law at all. It does
not seem that the federal interest shown in Williams has any bear-
ing on the tribal immunity cases, and for that reason the holding
should not be extended.
The question then remains as to what interest the federal
government has in tribal immunity. It is difficult to see why there
should be any greater interest in preventing suits against Indian
tribes in state court (especially a state in which a reservation is
located) than in preventing suits against states in other states'
courts. Nevada v. Hall seems to say there is no such federal in-
terest.
The nature of the federal government's interest in tribal
autonomy, and the extent to which that interest requires tribal
immunity, should be examined in the next Morgan-type case. On-
ly in that way will it be possible to determine the true extent of
any conflicts between the exercise of state jurisdiction and federal
interest involved, and only if the conflict can be clearly examined
can the full extent of federal preemption be determined.
The issue of preemption has been discussed here in connection
with tribal immunity from suit in state courts. It has been noted
above, that the same federal fiduciary interests in promoting In-
dian tribal autonomy are responsible for tribal immunity in
federal courts. This is not to say that the Indian tribes do not
have inherent sovereignty and autonomy. Rather, it is a recogni-
tion that immunity from suit in a particular court will be granted
or refused according to the laws of that sovereign. The attempt
here has been to discover the policies that have motivated the
state and federal courts to grant immunity from suit to Indian
tribes. In both, the reason seems to be the federal government's
fiduciary interest in preserving and encouraging tribal autonomy.
Tribal Sovereignty: The All-Important Backdrop
It is clearly established that a tribe's sovereignty-its power to
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govern itself and its territory-is inherent.67 That is, it is not
derived from the federal government nor from any otler power.
On the other hand, this power continues only at the sufferance of
Congress. It may be snuffed out completely or be limited either
as to the subject matter or the territory to which it extends. It
even appears that Congress can resurrect the sovereign power of a
tribe after it has been declared dead."8
And so, the existence of tribal autonomy depends upon the
continuing willingness of Congress to recognize and protect it. Is
there any guarantee .that it will do so? There is no constitutional
guarantee such as that given to the states in the tenth amendment,
which has been held to prohibit the application of some congres-
sional statutes to state governments."9 Moreover, Congress is not
limited to its constitutional powers in regulating Indians. Its
trustee status gives it absolute discretion and power over the
tribes.70
Strangely, this very fact may provide some certainty that In-
dian tribes will retain their sovereignty. The Supreme Court has
held that Congress and the executive branch have a fiduciary duty
to act in the best interests of the Indian tribes,7 and unless there
is a drastic reversal of policy-which appears unlikely-the courts
will probably continue to hold that it is in the best interests of the
tribes to govern themselves. Thus, the only way that Congress
could escape its duty to promote tribal self-determination would
be to give up its trustee status. However, since its status as trustee
is the source of its plenary power, it seems unlikely that this
would happen. Governments rarely surrender power voluntarily.
Therefore, at least for the forseeable future, Indian tribes will
continue to exercise sovereign governmental powers. Inevitably
there will be conflicts between those powers and state and federal
governmental activities. In this area, the federal government has
67. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (U.N.M. ed. 1971) quoted in United States
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978). Cf. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
68. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978). Compare United States v.
Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876) with United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
69. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
70. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
71. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935); Cramer v. United States,
261 U.S. 219 (1923); Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 100 (1919); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). Cf. Man-
chester Band v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Pyramid Lake Paiute





the advantage of the Kagama plenary powers doctrine. Conse-
quently, the federal government will always prevail when its ac-
tivities conflict with exercises of tribal governmental power.
The conflicts between state and tribal governments, however,
present different questions. The principles upon which their in-
herent interests in self-government should be balanced are still be-
ing developed. But the most prominent factor has turned out to
be the federal government's interest in promoting tribal
autonomy. The trend clearly has been away from the idea of in-
herent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state power andtoward
reliance on federal preemption." Preemption may even be claimed
for tribal ordinances where Congress has delegated part of its
power to tribal government."
On the other hand, principles for limiting tribal authority have
been announced in cases like Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,"' which held that Indian tribes cannot exercise those
powers of an autonomous state which have been expressly ter-
minated by Congress, or which are inconsistent with their status.
And in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n," the Court stated
that tribal sovereignty was relevant only as "a backdrop against
which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read
' 76
in determining the extent of tribal power. Since McClanahan, the
Supreme Court cases have all looked back to its language and
77reasoning.
Nevertheless, it is clear from the cases that the "backdrop"
view of Indian sovereignty has not weakened the federal interest
in preserving tribal autonomy. The preemption limitations on
state governmental power have proven much greater than the
above mentioned limitations on tribal power. Indeed, since
Williams was handed down in 1959, the Supreme Court has ap-
proved state regulation in Indian country only once."
Thus, it can be seen that the same fiduciary interest of the
federal government in promoting tribal autonomy, which was
controlling in the tribal immunity area, is controlling here. The
72. McClanahan v. Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). See Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
74. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
75.- 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
76. Id. at 172.
77. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976);
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
78. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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most significant difference is that in this area the courts have
relegated sovereignty to a consideration-although an important
one-rather than a magic word used to conjure up an automatic
disposition for every case. It is hoped that this trend will find its
way into the tribal immunity cases.
Conclusion
Although Indian tribes have many attributes of sovereignty,
their governmental power is not complete and the term "sov-
ereignty" cannot be thrown up as a sufficient means of resolving
in the Indians' favor all conflicts of power with the states.
However, one traditional attribute of sovereignty-sovereign
immunity-should not be used as the name for tribal immunity
from suit. The American version of sovereign immunity in a
sovereign's own court is an anomaly in the American system of
justice and has even less excuse for being adopted by Indian
tribes. Furthermore, the tribes would be foolish to claim that
their immunity from suit in state and federal courts is based
merely on sovereignty, as is the immunity of states and foreign
nations, because there would then be no reason to continue
granting greater immunity to tribes than to other sovereigns. The
extensive immunity from suit granted to Indian tribes actually
rests on the federal government's fiduciary interest in promoting
tribal autonomy.
It is ironic that of the two terms-"sovereignty" and
"sovereign immunity"-courts have found it easier to set aside
the one that has the more legitimate relation to Indian tribes. It is
hoped that the courts will recognize that tribal immunity is a
result of the federal interest in promoting tribal self-government,
and will abandon the use of the magical term "sovereign immuni-
ty." They would then be free to more clearly define the contours
of the federal interest in having Indian tribes immune from suit.
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